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Lampung villagers massacred 
Dozens of people were killed in Central Lampung, 
Sumatra when armed troops surrounded the hamlet of 
Talangsari-III, opened fire on the villagers and set 
fire to their homes. 
The government has imposed a clampdown on 
information, and closed the area to outsiders making 
it impossible to assess the true extent of the tragedy. 
The hamlet was still sealed off at the end of Febru-
ary, three weeks after the massacre. [Tempo, 4 March 
1989) The government said that 27 villagers were 
killed, including Anwar, a Muslim activist, also known 
as Warsidi. 
Asiaweek's correspondent appears to have been the 
only journalist to succeed in getting close to the 
village. A couple of weeks after the tragedy, she 
wrote: 
This week Talangsari Jay in ruins. A child's foot 
poked out from under the ashes of what was once a 
house. This and eleven other piles of ashes and 
scorched beams were nearly all that remained of the 
hamlet of 300 people. [Asiaweek, 24 February 1989) 
Detainees t.ortured 
According to an account of the massacre received in 
London from a reliable source in Indonesia, the 
massacre was part of an operation by the army to 
quell unrest in the province of Lampung. Para-
commandos of the army's elite corps, Kopassus, under 
the command of Captain Sutiman, were used in the 
operation. 
Early in January, according to our source, several 
people, most of them young men who had been holding 
religious gatherings in their homes ( usroh), were 
arrested. They were badly tortured by Captain 
Sutiman and his men: 
They were forced to take off their clothes and after 
this, Sutiman brutally tortured ustad Fahruddin (not 
his resl name), pulling out his pubic hair and burning 
his penis with lighted cigarettes. (Others) had their 
fingers broken by Sutiman. Mursyid, a 27-year old 
pupil of Fahruddin, was ordered to swsllow a handful 
of hot peppers. When he refused to do so, Sutiman 
grabbed the peppers and rubbed them in his face. 
After hearing about these brutalities, their col-
leagues decided to retaliate. On 3 February, they 
ambushed Sutiman's car on his way back from opera-
tions in Lampung and took him hostage. The next day, 
they wrote to the military authorities, offering to 
release Sutiman in exchange for their detained 
colleagues. Three days later, "troops attacked the 
place where Sutiman was being held, firing at random 
regardless of the presence of innocent people". At the 
time of the attack, nothing had yet happened to 
Sutiman but, "since the attack continued relentlessly, 
the youths had no option but to kill Sutiman and 
resist the troops who were attacking them". According 
to this account, 57 people were killed and 32 were 
gravely wounded. 
Talangsari hamlet had a population of about 300 and 
all accounts agree that not a soul was left after the 
massacre. This is why some sources put the death-
toll as high as 300. But it is also clear that many 
succeeded in escaping into the surrounding country-
side. 
The Talangsari disaster had a traumatic effect 
throughout the district. Shops in the sub-district 
capital, Metro, were closed for several days and army 
security around government offices was very tight. 
Inhabitants in other villages fled their homes, fearing ~ 
that more battles might occur. Troops were known to 
be combing the region in search of more 'Anwar fol-
lowers' and various estimates of the number of 
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LAMPUNG MASSACRE 
arrests were mentioned in the press. According to 
Ls mpung Post [24 February], a hundred people had 
been arrested. 
The military authorities in Lampung say that a 
number of people were arrested, of whom "about 20" 
will be tried. One is said to be Fadillah, alleged to 
have attacked remote army and police posts. [Mer-
deka, 3 March] 
The army have extended their search for 'instiga-
tors' to Central and East Java. Among those arrested 
is a former usroh prisoner trom Karanganyar named 
Sugiman, known also as Yulianto. [Sugiman was tried 
in 1986 and given a sentence of ten years. Later the 
sentence was reduced to seven years on appeal. The 
Supreme Court reconsidered the case in March 1988 
and decided to quash the sentence, recognising that 
usroh was not on the list of banned organisations. 
This unexpected verdict did not lead to the release of 
any other convicted usroh prisoners.] 
Two people arrested in East Java by the army, 
using Bs.korstsns.sda powers, are alleged to have been 
followers of Warsidi. One, identified as Yani, 26 years, 
is said to have confessed to stabbing and beating 
Captain Sutiman. He and the other detainee, Dul Jalal, 
30 years, both come from Trenggalek, East Java but 
were living in Lampung. They returned home after the 
Talangsari massacre. Assistant for Intelligence of 
Bakorstanasda said they had been "intensely inter-
rogated" for information about Lampung. A third 
person, Im alias Sup, 35 years, was arrested in 
Malang by the police and handed over to Bakorstanas-
da for investigation. [Merdeka, 7 March and Jaws 
Post, 10 March] 
Government cover-up 
According to the official version, made public on 9 
February by Major-General Sunardi, military com-
mander of South Sumatra, acting as regional chairman 
of the new security agency, Bakorstanas(da), after an 
unsuccessful attempt to summon the leader of a 
'devianit Muslim group for consultations, a group of 
officials, among them Captain Sutiman, drove to the 
hamlet but were greeted with poisoned arrows, made 
of cycle spikes. They beat a hasty retreat leaving the 
badly wounded Sutiman behind. On the next day., by 
which time Sutiman was dead, troops were sent to 
retrieve his body. In the face of a renewed attack, "a 
close-range battle was unavoidable". [Kompss, 10 
February) 
But according to one of the first reports in the 
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Jakarta press, Major-General Sunardi was reported as 
saying that troops entered the village "to rescue an 
army captain held hostage by the rebels on the 
previous day. Captain Sutiman was later murdered by 
the group, said General Sunardi." [Jakarta Post, 10 
February] Other press reports said either that 
Sutiman was wounded or that he was dead when the 
attack occurred. There was no further reference to 
Sutiman having been taken hostage. 
The first army pronouncements about the affair 
named a group that was organising religious activities 
in Lampung as Komando Mujahideen Fisabillilah. This 
organisation is also mentioned in the account received 
independently from Indonesia. After first describing 
the group as a 'deviant' religious sect using religion 
'as a mask', the army changed their tune. Defence 
Department spokesman, Brigadier-General Nurhadi, 
now said that Anwar's group had 'hijacked• (me-
ncatut) the name of Islam. It should now be called 
'gerombolan pengacau keamanan Warsidi 1 (Warsidi's 
security disruptor gang) or GPK-Warsidi. 'GPK' is a 
term reserved for rebel movements and has, until 
now, been used only for the OPM in West Papua and 
Fretilin in East Timor. 
The army has ignored calls from lawyers for an 
independent inquiry into the massacre. These have 
come from Anwar Haryono, a member of the Institute 
for Legal Justice and the Petition-of-50 dissident 
group, the Legal Aid Institute, the Institute for 
Human Rights and from Adnan Buyung Nasution, now 
in Holland, who addressed his appeal to the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists.• 
Lampung shaken by social unrest 
The revolt in Talangsari has occurred against the 
background of growing social unrest and land dis-
putes throughout Lampung. Lampung was the first 
region outside Java colonised by the Dutch earlier 
this century with poor Javanese peasants. By 1941 the 
transmigrants already outnumbered the native popul-
ation, having reached 174,000. The population of 
Lampung is now around seven million. Although the 
government several years ago proclaimed Lampung to 
be over-populated and closed to transmigration, the 
population is still rising by more than 5" a year. 
Lampung is the prime example of a transmigration 
region that is now in a state of crisis because of 
pressures on land and attempts by speculators to 
profit from the labours of the transmigrants. 
Since 1981, transmigrants in the area have been 
under pressure to make way for reforestation after 
the region was pronounced a conservation area. 
People suspect however that reforestation is just an 
excuse to clear the land for speculators from Jakarta. 
According to Tempo [25 February 1989), thousands of 
families were moved to North Lampung in the mid 
1980s, leaving another 10,000 families still to be 
moved. The programme came to a halt for lack of 
funds but efforts to move them were resumed in 1987. 
The families fought back, removing stakes put round 
their land by forestry officials. Ministers have gone 
out of their way to deny that the Talangsari affair is 
in any way connected with this long-running dispute. 
Rouae-burntnc in Gununc Balak 
The most recent expulsion, the event which became 
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the catalyst for organised resistance, was the case of 
a thousand families in Gunung Balak, also in Way 
Jepara, who were ordered to abandon their coffee and 
clove plantations. When the villagers refused to move, 
local officials moved in and burnt down their homes. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin, No 91, February 1989.) 
Talangsari is located in the vicinity of Gunung 
Balak, a fertile region where small-holdings of coffee 
and rubber trees are now flourishing. It was formerly 
part of the village of Labuhan Ratu IV but last year 
was transferred to the Rajabasalama village. It was 
their new village chief who started reporting to the 
local military command that 'deviant' religious activ-
ities were taking place. 
The Suhart.o connection 
Although many Jakarta papers have drawn atten-
tion to the deepening land crisis in Lampung, none of 
them report that one of the private companies grant-
ed permission to implement the reforestation scheme 
is PT Citra Lamtoro-gung, owned by Siti Hadiati Ruk-
mana (also known as Tutut), President Suharto's 
oldest daughter. Peasants in conflict with this com-
pany, under continual pressure from the local military 
command to move, were arrested and tortured but 
they still refused to move. In 1984, they sought 
advice from NGOs in Jakarta but the NGOs were later 
warned by the security agency, Kopkamtib not to take 
up their case. 
Another company in conflict with local inhabitants is 
Mitsugoro, a joint venture between Kosgoro, an army-
led company, and Mitsubishi of Japan. 2,400 hectares 
of land belonging to 120 transmigrants were taken 
over by the Mitsugoro. The transmigrants took their 
complaint to court but lost the case. 
Ez-prlaonera 
A number of transmigrants in Central Lampung are 
former political prisoners who were arrested and held 
without trial as communist suspects in 1965. Many of 
these ex-tapol transmigrants were resettled in Labuh-
an Ratu IV village which is also known as Desa 
Pancasila. Tempo (25 February 1989) reports that the 
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Transmigrants in Gunung Balak who have been 
ordered to move off their land. [Tempo, 18 February 
1989] 
children of these ex-prisoners have had difficulty 
finding work because they do not have a 'clean 
environment'. In January, 140 people who had jost be 
appointed as elementary school teachers or school-
cleaners were dismissed on the grounds that their 
'environment was not clean'. [Kompas, 14 January and 
Tempo, 21 January] These frustrations have added to 
the discontent fuelled by the land disputes. 
Although these facts are well known, the security 
authorities have played down suggestions that the 
events in Talangsari are linked to the 'latent com-
munist danger'. This suggests that the government 
wants to avoid any hint that Muslims and leftwingers 
may be working together with people defending their 
land ri~hts.• 
-----------------------------------------------------
A people's revolt 
From our correspondent in Jakarta 
Both BAKIN (the Intelligence Coordination Agency) and 
the commander of the armed forces have tried to play 
down the bloody events in Way Jepara, Central 
Lampung, and to hide the true facts. 
Sukadana and Talangsari in Way Jepara are trans-
migration areas that were covered in virgin forest 
when they were first settled. After years of sweat 
and toil, disease and hunger, the newcomers created 
a prosperous region. But once their trees were about 
to produce the harvest they had worked so hard for, 
they were ordered to get out and move on to barren 
land. The bureaucrats used a thousand and one 
reasons to justify the expulsion of the transmigrants. 
It was not the first time such a thing had happened. 
The transmigrants had been told to move a number of 
times before, after their land, as if by magic, had 
been declared the property of civilian or military 
officials. This is also happening in Kalimantan but 
there, the transmigrants have responded by packing 
up and returning to Java. 
In Lampung, land thefts have occurred on a massive 
scale. In some regions, thousands of hectares have 
now been converted into palm-oil and sugar planta-
tions owned by members of the Suharto family. 
Years of unrest 
For years, the people in the area have resisted this 
evil system. At first, they submitted complaints and 
protests to the authorities, but to no avail. After 
years of being ignored, they began to organise. There 
were lectures and sermons to cultivate a political 
awareness, as well as physical training for a large 
number of people. 
Local officials were certainly not unaware of what 
was going on but they avoided reporting these 
developments to their superiors in Jakarta, realising 
that it was all the result of their own transgressions. 
Moreover, many people in Jakarta are involved in the 
seizure of thousands of hectares of land whose 
commercial value had soared because of the sweat of ~ 
the transmigrants. It is reckoned that the roads, 
irrigation canals and bridges they have built are 
worth three thousand million rupiahs. No wonder the 
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men of greed wanted to get their fiands on it. 
A defeat for the armed torcea 
Your correspondent in Jakarta has reason to believe 
that the person leading this revolt is a skilled tac-
tician. The rebel forces were not crushed, nor did 
any of the army provocations succeed because, well in 
advance of the attack, many local people had left the 
area. 
From intelligence sources, it is clear that: 
* The leaders of the revolt realised that they did not 
have the capacity to fight off a major attack by 
regular troops because their movement was more in 
the nature of raising political awareness. 
* Before the attack was launched, they evacuated the 
inhabitants to a safe area, taking special care to 
protect the women and children, the elderly and 
people involved in production. Besides, they had to 
avoid being provoked by the army, such as, for 
instance, someone getting killed so that this could be 
blamed on the rebels. 
* The movement was split up into three fronts: 
1. the nucleus which withdrew to the forest and 
dispersed, . 
2. reserve forces which launched attacks on pohce 
and army posts, and . 
3. a small force of people given the task of goadm.g 
the enemy into attacking its defence position. This 
was a kind of suicide force. 
The army unit that launched the attack did not have 
enough troops to hunt down or destroy the nucleus 
which had retreated. As a result, it was unable to 
annihilate the rebel forces. Although government 
officials have tried to play down the extent of the 
rebellion, an intensive territorial operation has since 
been under way. Troops were sent out to comb the 
entire region. An intensive intelligence operation has 
also been launched. The harbours of Merak and 
Bakauheni, the entry points into Lampung and Java, 
are being closely watched, as well as inter-provincial 
traffic throughout Sumatra. 
Claims that the rebels are behaving recklessly and 
killing off local people are untrue. The army's own 
intelligence has discovered that the local people 
enthusiastically, if silently 1 support the rebellion. By 
the middle of February, only 10 per cent of the rebel 
forces had been murdered or captured.• 
Playing down the issues 
As we go to press, there is news of a serious incident 
in Dompu on the island of Sumbawa, Nusatenggara 
(NTT) described by some as "a clash between the 
army and Muslims". H.C Prinsen, chair of the Institute 
of Defence of Human Rights, said that eleven people 
were killed. Many people were arrested, in Dompu as 
well as in Den Pasar, the capital of Bali. 
The incident happened at the beginning of March 
but nothing appeared in the press at the time be-
cause editors had been told by phone not to report 
anything though no-one knew what it was that should 
not be reported. On 20 March, Kompss added to the 
mystery with a front-page report of a visit to Bima, 
the capital of Sumbawa, by Major-General Sintong 
Panjaitan, military commander of NTT and quoting him 
as saying that security there "is no worse than 
anywhere else". In Dompu, the district chief, Colonel 
Moh. Jacob would not be drawn, except to say that "if 
there were one or two excesses, this was not unusual 
and they could be resolved by persuasion, in the 
family spirit". 
On 22 March, the Indonesian Observer ran an 
editorial which began by saying that the incident 
"was serious enough to warrant the authorities 
making phone calls to the news media to put a lid on 
it." With the authorities at such pains to play down a 
serious incident - following the events in Lampung -
the impression is gaining ground that the military 
is facing crises in several parts of the country. 
In the same vein, ministers are trying to play down 
the significance of growing student protest, most of 
it in support of people unjustly treated by local 
authorities, particularly on land issues. No action has 
yet been taken to clamp down on the students. Home 
Affairs Minister, General Rudini has even gone on 
record as saying the students "are within their rights 
to protest". 
Six months ago, President Suharto took the unusual 
step of hiving off the Agraria Directorate from 
Rudini's Ministry and setting up a Land Affairs 
Agency within the State Secretariat, directly under 
his own control. This suggested at the time that land 
was becoming the central issue in Indonesian politics. 
Equally central is the question of who copes with the 
disputes. Rudini clearly resents Suharto's move to 
undermine his department's role. To add to the 
confusion, the army's new security agency, Bakorsta-
nas has all the powers it needs to deal with "threats 
to stability", leaving Rudini's apparatus on the 
sidelines. 
Although Suharto seems to have strengthen his own 
position by taking control of the key question of 
land, the regime has become more vulnerable to 
conflicts between military commanders, provincial 
governors and the various central agencies over bow 
to deal with the growing crisis. Kedung Ombo, Lam-
pung and now Sumbawa may be the beginning of a 
spiral of events leading to some major changes though 
it would be foolhardy to predict that the forces of 
democracy will emerge any the stronger.• 
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Land dispute in Kedung Ombo 
Peasant resistance to expulsion from their land which haa been e:rproprie.ted for the Kedung 
Ombo dam has now become the focus of attention in Indonesia, arousing solidarity actions and 
exposing splits within the regime on how to deal with these 'recalcitrant' villagers. For the 
background to the present crisis, please see TAPOL Bulletin No. 91, February 1989. 
The water is rising fast at Kedung Ombo. Yet the 
peasants living within the reservoir area of this World 
Bank funded dam in Central Java are still refusing to 
move out. According to latest press reports, there are 
1,786 families who still reject the government alterna-
tives of cash compensation, transmigration or local 
resettlement. The inadequate compensation levels offer 
no opportunity to buy alternative land and the 
families have no wish to transmigrate. Only 25 families 
have moved to Kayen, the local resettlement option 
intended to accommodate 400 families. There is no 
water, no road to the nearest markets, and the 1000 
square meters of land per family is not enough to 
support them. 
There is growing concern for the health and safety 
of the families who are refusing to move. Many, forced 
out of their villages, have carried their demolished 
homes and belongings to higher ground. As one vil-
lager put it, the people refuse to get into trucks 
provided by the authorities as they cannot be sure 
where they will be taken. 
Baergenc7 aid for children barred 
One of those showing concern is Romo Mangun-
wijaya, a Catholic priest renowned for social work 
among the poor. He was refused access to the vil-
lagers by the military who have now sealed off the 
area. The priest, who wants to administer spiritual 
and material aid to the estimated 3,500 children living 
in Kedung Ombo, managed to visit people inside by 
avoiding the military checkpoints. He launched a 
public appeal for donations and applied for permission 
to live among the families for two or three months. 
Although Romo Mangun's efforts were called 'noble' 
by Interior Minister Rudini, permission was refused 
by the Central Java Governor, Major-General Ismail. 
Governor Ismail has admitted that Romo Mangun's aims 
are humanitarian but that the government has "al-
ready been acting in a most humanitarian way". [Mer-
deka, 2 March] Governor Ismail has the support of 
Major-General Soepardjo Roestam, Minister-Coor-
dinator for People's Welfare and former governor of 
Central Java. "People who refuse to move should not 
be helped," he said, after meeting the President. 
[Kompas, 17 March] 
The Kedung Ombo crisis is being widely reported in 
the press. The controversy between ministers has 
been sharpened by Romo Mangun's initiative. He 
describes his plans for social solidarity as 'putting 
PancBSila into practice'. By not allowing him in, the 
government is alienating those sympathetic to the 
Kedung Ombo villagers. 
Growfna support 
Support for the villagers from outside the area is 
growing. On February 6, the students' "Solidarity 
Group for the Victims ot Development in Kedung 
Ombo" staged three major demonstrations. More than 
a hundred students from Diponegoro University 
delivered a letter of protest to the regional assembly 
Some of the children in Kedung 0111bo whose .homes 
have been inundated by the slowly-rising dam water. 
[Tempo, 18 March 1989) 
in Semarang. In Jakarta, another group of more than 
a hundred students from Jakarta and Bogor staged a 
sit-in at the Ministry of Home Affairs, while a third 
group of students from Surabaya, Solo, Salatiga, 
Semarang and Jogjakarta walked to the dam and 
demonstrated in Kedung Cumpleng, a village in the 
reservoir area. 
On the same day letters of protest signed by 961 
people were sent to the President, the Central Java 
governor and several ministers. The signatories 
included students from 45 higher education institu-
tions in Java and Lombok, artists, social workers, 
lecturers and pastors. They demanded that the filling 
of the dam be stopped until the evacuation had been 
completed fairly, that the compensation be increased 
and based on consultation with the people, that the 
government take action against officials who were 
committing malpractice in the performance of their 
duties and that an independent development control 
body be formed. The letter said: "We fear that unless 
the dispute is settled satisfactorily there will be 
unrest and mistrust among the people who will be 
suspicious of development, which could shake the 
stability of the country". [Neraca Hak-Azasf- a sten-
ciled student brochure - Vol. 4) 
After the protests on 6 February, some newspapers 
were issued later than usual because of "technical 
faults", meaning that they had probably received 
phone-calls instructing them to drop reports about 
the protests. However one or two slipped through the 
net. Kedaulatsn Rakyat [ 7 February] ran a story on 
the demonstration at Kedung Ombo when students 
protested with banners and placards, shouting 
slogans in support of the villagers. They were only 
allowed into the village after lengthy discussions with ~ 
Lieutenant-Colonel Drajat, the Boyolali district milita-
ry commander. The protest passed off peacefully and 
the military were thanked by the students. However, 
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when they returned to Salatiga, they heard that 
several students were being sought by army intel-
ligence, six of whom were waiting in the headquarters 
of the solidarity group. The students were accused of 
holding meetings without permission. Some of the 
students left Salatiga promptly. 
The sit-in at the Ministry of Home Affairs was only 
reported by one Indonesian paper, but was also 
picked up by AFP. Over 100 students sat holding 
banners and placards for more than five hours surr-
ounded by a security force of about 200. Their 
demand to speak to the Minister was refused and 
eventually five students agreed to meet the Secretary 
General of the Ministry instead.• 
World Bank record exposed 
In TAPOL Bulletin No. 91, we reported that one of the only endeavours by the World Bank to 
investigate the crisis in Kedung Ombo was to send a consultant to the area in May 1988; the 
results were never made public. TAPOL now has a leaked copy of the consultant's report which 
analyses land resettlement problems in four World Bank-funded projects. The Report, "A Review 
of Land Acquisition and Resettlement under Four World Bank Financed Projects" was written in 
June 1988 by World Bank consultant, David Butcher. 
Turnlna a blind e79 
Although the World Bank first became involved in 
the Kedung Ombo project in 1984, the report reveals 
that "not until 1987 did the dissatisfaction of a 
significant number of people with the acquisition 
process become known to the Bank" [p.48]. A chronol-
ogy of intimidation and harassment since 1984 prep-
ared by the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), was handed to 
a Bank official in Jakarta, but as the "Minister of 
Public Works wrote to say everyone had been compen-
sated and had departed the area, the matter was not 
taken up and the land acquisition was not super-
vised" [p.18]. 
In the section entitled "Solution to the Problems", 
Butcher suggests that "the Bank could consider 
withholding loan disbursement pending a satisfactory 
resolution of the problem, perhaps inter alia insisting 
on a delay in impoundment". His preferred recommen-
dation was clearly more in line with the Bank's 
intentions: "The Bank might be better advised to 
Inform the GOI [Government of Indonesia] of its 
dissatisfaction with the situation, and seek agreement 
in principle for a far-reaching review of land acquisi-
tion and resettlement policy across the board, which 
would ensure more satisfacto'ry outcomes for future 
projects. The Bank in exchange would have to (con-
tinue to) turn a blind eye to the fate of the remain-
ing 791 (sic) households who have yet to accept 
compensation" [p.55]. 
The ,._t card' 
The report also reveals that 90% of the Kedung Ombo 
oustees were expected to transmigrate and that the 
local resettlement village of Kayen was to be kept as 
a "last card", to be played when the transmigration 
option is revived at the time of inundation [p.55], The 
compensation levels set by the government are shown 
in the report to be inadequate because "the replace-
ment land costs more than the people's compensation 
can purchase" [p.60]. The Satya Wacana Christian 
University team monitoring land acquisition were not 
trusted by the Kedung Ombo villagers. 
The consultant reported that the villagers had been 
denied LBH legal aid since 1987 when the Deputy 
Governor (of Central Java) told the people not to have 
contact with outsiders because they were connected 
with the PKI. Yet in a recent BBC World Service 
interview, the Bank's Jakarta Director, Attila Sonmez, 
stated that "there was due process available to the 
landowners in case they are dissatisfied with the level 
of compensation to challenge it in court and have it 
revised". [Development '89, 15 March 1989) 
Another kind of stigma is discussed in the Butcher 
report. It cites the LBH claim that the villagers were 
threatened with the "OT" (member of an illegal 
organisation) label if they refused the compensation 
and concludes that, once branded, they were unlikely 
to move: "To remain where they are means a form of 
security, to move means uncertainty of survival, and 
victimisation by strangers" [p.52] • Butcher also 
doubts the potential for alternative employment 
around the dam until the environmental problems of 
river pollution and soil erosion are addressed. 
The report concludes that the oustees of three of 
the projects including Kedung Ombo who have ac-
cepted compensation are worse off than they were 
before and therefore "have in effect personally 
subsidised these projects" [p. 72]. 
The consultant recommends that "the Bank should 
give serious consideration to including the costs of 
land acquisition (and of course resettlement), in the 
next loan for a project in Indonesia". If it had been 
following its own guidelines, the Bank would have 
already been doing this for eight years. According to 
Price 50 pence a copy, 
80 pence including 
postage. 
Occasional Reports no. 10 contains the 
Open Letter to the World Bank and the 
full correspondence between Tapol and 
the World Bank. 
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LANO DISPUTES 
Dutch World Service, articles and a letter in the 
London Guardian, the Guardian Weekly and now the 
Open Letter) has put the Bank on the defensive. 
Various staff at the Bank have failed to respond to 
TAPOL's questions and comments. A telex sent on 
February 10 states: "The Bank has been following up 
with government on the resettlement issues". TAPOL's 
reply criticised the Bank's persistence in relyinl on 
its contacts with the government instead of making 
efforts to examine independently what the victims 
want. TAPOL stressed the need to approach the 
resettlement problem with the help of an independent 
body. The Bank's response was merely an extension of 
the previous telex: "We are continuing to follow up 
closely with government on the need to ensure safety 
and shelter of families and are reviewing with the 
~--------------------------1 government alternative employment and income-
the Bank's Operational Manual Statement no.2.33 of 
1980, "The cost of the resettlement component, as a 
necessary and integral part of the total project, 
should be included in the total project cost". 
Open letter to the Banlt 
The failure of the Bank to live up to the standards 
it sets itself is one of the issues taken up in an open 
letter from TAPOL addressed to the World Bank. So 
far, other signatories are: IMBAS (Initiative for Human 
Rights in ASEAN States), the Dutch Indonesia Commit-
tee, JATAN (the Japan Tropical Forest Action Group), 
IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs) and Friends of the Earth Japan. After critic-
ising the Bank's record in all aspects of the Kedung 
Ombo project, the letter says that the Bank: 
- failed to ensure that workable resettlement arran-
gements were agreed before the completion of loan 
negotiations, 
- failed to inform itself of the real situation at Ked-
ung Ombo and failed to act on the LBH information, 
- was secretive regarding the results of its own 
investigations, 
- failed to exert pressure on the Indonesian Govern-
ment during development to ensure that they prov-
ided sufficient compensation and replacement land, 
- failed to do so even after the dam gates had been 
closed. 
The letter concludes: "It is imperative that the Bank 
face its responsibilities towards the people who are 
disadvantaged by its development projects generally, 
but it should also act now to remedy the desperate 
situation in Kedung Ombo". 
World Bank on the defenalve 
TAPOL has been engaged in a long correspondence 
with the Bank It is clear that the publicity sur-
rounding the Kedung Ombo project both within the 
country and abroad (items on both the BBC and the 
continuation from page 8 
government/PT SAM idea will force the peasants to 
become wage-labourers, depriving them of control 
over their resources and reducing income potential. 
Law79ra lntlaidated 
The LBH, representing the farmers since February 
1987, have not escaped government intimidation. In 
November 1988, two LBH representatives and four of 
earning opportunities for those families who now wish 
to remain in the local area instead of resettling else-
where." 
Romo 
Mangunwijaya 
Yet, the government has refused to renegotiate on 
anything. We know from the Butcher Report and 
countless examples throughout Indonesia that wage 
labour employment as a substitute for land ownership 
only leads to impoverishment. TAPOL has repeatedly 
insisted that the Bank must press the Indonesian 
government to listen to and answer the peasants' just 
demands. Consultation has been conspicuous by its 
absence since the beginning of the project. Now it is 
the only just way out.• 
[The Open Letter and the full correspondence between 
TAPOL and the World Bank is available to readers in 
Occasional Reports No. 10.J 
their clients were summoned to the local military 
command, then taken to the police station in Garut 
and accused of holding a subversive meeting and 
gathering the masses. The LBH members were released 
after a few hours but the farmers were held for two 
days. Meanwhile, the LBH insist that the letter refus-
ing land rights to the peasants from the district 
chief, sent so long after the peasants' request, 
violated government regulations and that the queation 
was anyway outside his authority. 
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Peasant protest and women's 
solidarity in Badega 
Hundreds of families are being thrown off land they 
have worked since the 1940s so that a private com-
pany can establish a tea plantation. The 579 families 
grew food crops in the Badega area of West Java until 
the company, PT Surya Andaka Mustik (PT SAM) was 
given rights over the land by the government. The 
farmers protested by pulling up stakes marking the 
plantation area and pulling up tea seedlings in order 
to plant their own crops. As a result thirteen farmers 
including one woman are now in jail; five have been 
classified as ringleaders and eight as accessories. 
They face criminal charges. 
Women demonatrat.e ln Parliament 
The Women's Group for Badega Solidarity, an or-
ganisation of housewives and students from several 
institutes of higher education, have launched a well-
organised campaign to publicise the fate of the 
Badega families and demand that they are treated 
fairly. Such action by a women's group who sig-
nificantly refer to themselves as perempuan (women) 
rather than the more genteel wsnits {equivalent of 
'lady') is unprecedented in Indonesia. 
On January 21, fifteen members of the group deman-
ded to speak to the Chairman of Parliament, Kharie 
Suhud in Jakarta. They entered the DPR building, 
saying they were going to the library, then demanded 
to see the leader of the House. Not to be fobbed off 
with a deputy, they sat on the steps in front of the 
House, giving out leaflets and stickers to House 
members and journalists, until five were granted an 
interview with Kharis Suhud. The women's accusations 
of incompetence against the regional assembly in West 
Java were countered by a 'be patient' plea from 
Suhud. [Jakarta Post, 21 January 1989] 
The Badega land dispute had been simmering for 
~. ·:~· . ~! "' '/T ,,-,·;~\\ '"; i ;·?,~·v.'7"":~T,.:' ,, ,~ .. ! ' ·'· -: ~:.··,• 
some time. The peasants who are represented by the 
Legal Aid Institute (LBH) have been attempting to 
gain government recognition of their ownership rights 
since 1984, two years before PT SAM were granted the 
rights. Their claim was based on government regula-
tions which state that farmers are given priority for 
the possession of neglected plantation land if they 
have been working it continuously. The land, origin-
ally owned by a Dutch company, was abandoned 
during the Japanese occupation, then leased to 
another company who collected rents from the peas-
ants; it reverted to the state in 1980. 
In January 1985 the district chief replied to their 
request by refusing to recognise their rights, saying 
that plantation land must not change its function. In 
any case, they were told, the land was already in the 
process of being leased to PT SAM. More requests 
were sent by the peasants to the Interior and Agric-
ulture Ministries, the West Java Governor and the 
District Chief. In July 1986 the land was acquired by 
PT SAM. Since then the company has been attempting 
to persuade the farmers to leave, promising them jobs 
at the tea plantation at Rp 600 per day. 
Defencllng land la •a crlatnal ottenae• 
The thirteen now facing criminal charges were 
arrested in September 1988. In October. a team of 
fifty officials from the Agriculture Ministry, the local 
government, and members of the police and the 
military carried out a combined operation to erect a 
permanent fence and force the people off their land. 
The area of land worked by the families covered 
498,416 hectares; they have received a risible 70 
hectares from the authorities as replacement which 
means each family will get only 0.12 hectares. The 
continued on page 7 
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Journalism a high risk profession 
Two journalists have died in North Sumatra after 
being beaten up in separate incidents because of 
news items published by their newspapers. These 
deaths, along with other acts of violence against 
journalists, reveal that journalism is becoming a high-
risk profession in Indonesia with little if any protec-
tion from the authorities. 
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Saud Batubara was found dead in Paya Pasir village, 
Medan last October. An autopsy revealed that he had 
died of stab wounds in the neck. Shortly before his 
death he wrote an article about a syndicate involved 
in baby-trafficking. In particular, he investigated the 
case of a woman who had agreed to sell her new-born 
baby because she was unable to pay hospital fees but 
later tried to annul the agreement and retrieve her 
child. When she took her dispute with the racketeers 
to the police, the police took the side of the rack-
eteers and forced her to sign over the baby in ex-
change for cash. This was the letter later given to 
Saud Batubara which he used to report the scandal 
in Sinar Indonesia Baru, a newspaper published in 
Medan. Tempo reports that although the baby racket 
case is under police investigation, the police are not 
yet linking Saud's murder to that case. 
Azhar Adam, a journalist working for the Medan 
newspaper Sinar Pembangunan, died last August after 
being beaten up by an official at the Medan office of 
the Traffic Department. Following the incident, the 
victim went to the police to report but after arriving 
home, he started vomiting blood. He died twenty days 
later in hospital. The official responsible for his death 
was tried but was acquitted; the court was not 
convinced that Azhar Adam had died as a result of 
being beaten up although his wife insisted that he 
had been in a state of shock ever since, 
Two other journalists who have been beaten up in 
North Sumatra are Ismanto who writes for the Medan 
daily, Waspada., and Yoesdi Noer, who writes for Bukit 
Barisan. 
Ismanto was set upon not for anything he wrote or 
for anything that appeared in the paper he works 
for. Another paper in the Waspada group, Dunia 
Wanita, had exposed a racket operating from the Rudi 
Pirngadi general hospital in Medan illegally taking 
blood from donors and selling it for transfusions. The 
article warned that such racketeering was extremely 
dangerous as well as being illegal. The chief racketeer 
is actually quoted by Tempo as saying he knew that 
Ismanto did not work for Dunia Wanita but he was the 
only journalist from the Waspada-group around in the 
Pirngadi hospital. 
Yoesdi Noer was beaten up by two police officers 
after being accused of handling stolen property when 
in fact he was collecting his own motorbike from a 
police lost property office. 
Tempo lists other journalists who have been beaten 
up recently: a journalist of Vista, who was beaten up 
by the husband of the artist, Jenny Rachman; a 
Merdeka journalist in Kalimantan who was beaten up 
by a businessman; a Pos Kota journalist who was 
beaten up at the Central Jakarta District Court by 
the brother of a public prosecutor; and a journalist 
of the weekly, Editor, who was beaten up at Glugur 
Medan Hospital by a doctor.• 
[Source: Tempo, 4 March 1989] 
Satanic Verses banned in Indonesia 
The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie has been 
banned in Indonesia by an edict of the Attorney-
General issued in mid-March because the book "might 
disturb national stability". Before the ban was dec-
lared, there was already a partial ban on importing 
the book. 
The Attorney-General warned anyone owning a copy 
or a photocopy of the book to turn it in or face up to 
a year in prison or a fine. 
Several Muslim Councils have issued their own 
statements condemning the Rushdie book; the Aceh 
Council even supported Ayatollah Khomeini's call for 
the author to be done to death.• 
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Women in clash with armed troops 
Fifty peasant women protesting against the closure of 
an access road linking their village to the main road 
were confronted by armed troops when they tried to 
stop a wall being built to block up the road. Six of 
the women (Kompss later corrected this to seventeen) 
were badly injured when two army vehicles moving in 
reverse towards each other crushed the women in 
between. The troops then used tear-gas to disperse 
the women who showed no signs of wanting to move, 
even though their lives were seriously at risk from 
the continued movement of the trucks. 
The disputed road is the only path linking their 
village, Susuk to the main thoroughfare in the city of 
Medan. It is their only route for bringing their 
products to market and its closure. will force the vil-
lagers to take a long way round. 
The villagers have lived in Susuk since 1949. They 
were persuaded to sell part of the land for the 
construction of the University of North Sumatra 
campus but they refused to sell the land where the 
road runs. The university has been trying since 1985 
to close the road. An agreement was reached last 
November to narrow the road so that it was just wide 
enough for becsks and other three-wheeled carts to 
pass. 
But the university authorities decided to block up 
the road anyway, claiming that it was a security risk. 
Despite strong protests, workmen were brought in to 
build a concrete wall. The fifty women staged a 
protest, shouting slogans, painting slogans on the 
wall and refusing to shift even when confronted by 
thirty armed troops. 
Sex education book banned 
The Attorney-General has banned a book entitled Adik 
Bsru or New Baby ('adik' means younger brother or 
sister) and has warned that anyone distributing, 
selling or possessing copies of the book is liable to 
be charged under Article 1 of Law No. 4/PNPS/1963, 
the anti-subversion law. The Attorney-General's ban 
said that the book 'borders on the pornographic'. 
Adik Bsru is a translation of a Swedish book en-
titled: Peter, Ids und Minimum which has been trans-
lated into many languages. It was published by PT 
Midas Surya Grafindo, and translated by Ing. Swanie 
Gunawan under the editorial control of Professor R. 
Conny Semiawan, a well-known educational specialist 
who was a member of the Executive Council of the 
International Society for the Prevention of Child 
Abuse and Neglect from 1983 to 1986. 
The book went on .sale earlier this year and led to 
cries of shame and offense in some newspapers 
because it contains illustrations of the male and 
female sex organs and explicit graphics about sexual 
intercourse. The book tells the story of a father 
whose wife ls pregnant and of how he explains to his 
young son and daughter the process of reproduction 
and birth, to prepared them for the arrival of the 
new member of the family. 
In a robust defence of the book, Wuri Sudjatmiko, 
a lecturer at Widya Mandala University, Surabaya, 
refutes claims that the book is titillating and a 
dangerous incitement t.o young children, or that it is 
The entrance to the road which is crucial to the 
women of Susuk. The slogans read: "Uphold justice 
and truth" 11nd "Don't be power-crazy". [Tempo, 11 
March 19891 
Following the incident, the women went to the 
Rector's office to protest. After meeting an official, 
they returned home to find that the wall had already 
been built, whereupon they resumed their protests 
and pulled down the concrete construction while it 
was still wet. The women are also to file a complaint 
against the military police. [Kompss, 4 and 14 March, 
and Tempo, 11 March 1989] • 
out of keeping with Indonesian attitudes towards sex. 
He argues that there are many books on sale at the 
bookshops and market stalls, freely available to 
anyone, including children, which depict sex more 
explicitly and in a very harmful way. No-one has ever 
suggested that such publications should be banned. 
[Kompas, 28 February 1989]• 
Pop singer's concerts banned 
A number of concerts to be given by the popular rock 
singer, !wan Fals, have been banned by the police. 
Many of the songs sung by Fals contain social critic-
ism. The singer was planning to given a series of 
concerts in 100 cities throughout the country, 
The first concert to be banned was to have taken 
place in Palembang on 10 March; permission had been 
granted by the local police but a few days before the 
concert, his manager was informed that the permit 
had been withdrawn on the orders of the Chief of 
Police in Jakarta. It is widely believed that the 
authorities in South Sumatra ~ere afraid that support 
for the rebellion in nearby Lampung might have been 
expressed at the concert. 
Other concerts Fals was due to give, in Padang, 
West Sumatra on 15 March, and later, in Medan, 
Lhokseumawa and Banda Aceh, have also been banned. 
[Tempo, 18 March 1989] • 
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Looking back at SuperSemar 
Twenty three years ago, on 11 March 1966, President 
Sukarno issued a letter of authorisation to General 
Suharto which became known as Supersemar, or Surat 
Perintah Sebelas Maret, the 11 March Instruction. 
Although the letter only authorised Suharto "to 
guarantee security and calm and the stability of 
Government ... while securing the personal safety of 
(Sukarno) ... . and absolutely execute all (his) teach-
ings", Suharto used it to take crucial political steps 
in contradiction to Sukarno's teachings. 
In his autobiography (see separate item), Suharto is 
very defensive about this event, insisting that he 
assumed power by constitutional means, which is all 
the more the reason to look at the sequence of events 
connected with this letter. 
* * * * * 
Some political observers regard 11 March 1966 as the 
turning point, when Sukarno's Orde Lama (the Old 
Order) was replaced by Suharto's Orde Ba.ru (the New 
Order). The following day, Suharto outlawed the PKI, 
the Indonesian Communist Party, and one week later 
he ordered the arrest of 15 ministers in the Sukarno 
cabinet, including two deputy prime ministers. 
Formally speaking this 0view may be correct but de 
facto Suharto had seized power much earlier. Already 
in October 1965, General Suharto had all the powers 
he needed to reverse the political situation by or-
chestrating the crackdown against the PKI and 
undermining Sukarno's control of events. He was 
commander of the army's strategic reserve command, 
Kostrad, commander of the all-powerful security 
command, Kopkamtib, commander of the army and 
chief-of-staff of Koti, the Supreme Command. What he 
now needed was Sukarno's formal authorisation to ban 
the already severely-battered Communist Party and to 
remove cabinet ministers loyal to Sukarno. Super-
semar was the means by which he achieved this. 
The events leading to Superae.ar 
Shortly before 11 March, it became known to generals 
loyal to Sukarno that the RPKAD, the pe.ra-comme.ndos, 
was preparing to attack Istana Negara, the official 
residence of President Sukarno. Sukarno was advised 
to leave Jakarta for Bogor, some 60 kms away. 
Three weeks earlier, on 21 February, President 
Sukarno had reshuffled his cabinet, infuriating 
Suharto's supporters by bringing in more Sukarno 
loyalists. General Nasution, who had escaped death on 
the night of 30 September, was replaced as Defence 
Minister by General Sarbini, a Sukarno loyalist. Other 
hard core anti-communists were replaced by Sukarno 
supporters. The only one to keep all his posts was 
General Suharto. 
The cabinet changes provided the momentum for 
rightwing students organised in the Students Action 
Front, KAMI to step up their demonstrations in the 
cities, blocking traffic and making it virtually impos-
sible for people to get to work. A close unity had 
been forged between the leaders of KAMI and the 
pro-Suharto officers, in particular in Kostrad. 
In his autobiography, General Nasution,*) describes 
how he defied Sukarno, refusing to surrender his 
post at the Defence Department and preventing 
General Sarbini from taking over. Nasution told 
Sarbini: "It would be sinful for me to accept an 
unjust decision of the President just like that. I will 
Djakarta 66 is now being shown in cinemas throughout 
Indonesia. With the contents personally supervised by 
Suharto, it is part of his current obsession with 
writing his own history. 
not give up the Ministry of Defence so easily", 
In this period, General Nasution was instrumental in 
advising and supporting the action fronts of stu-
dents, pupils and intellectuals. The deep-rooted 
antagonism between Nasution and Sukarno worked to 
Suharto's advantage. As the two men avoided each 
other, top-level communication took place only bet-
ween Sukarno and Suharto and between Nasution and 
Suharto. Suharto stayed on good terms with both. 
Calls to oust Sukarno and ban the PKI were left to 
Nasution and the action fronts. As he chipped away at 
Sukarno's political base, Suharto projected an image 
of neutrality on these two crucial issues. 
The action fronts had become increasingly shrill. 
Their Tritura or Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, the Three 
Demands of the People, called for the PKI to be ~ 
banned, the cabinet to be 'retooled' and prices to be 
lowered. Triture. was almost certainly drafted by 
intelligence officers at Kostrad, who were coordinating 
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the campaign against Sukarno. 
On 25 February, the new Sukarno cabinet banned 
KAMI and all student gatherings. Far from reducing 
tensions, this led to even more demonstrations. Some 
government departments were attacked and Foreign 
Minister Subandrio, Sukarno's closest adviser, became 
a target. Although Subandrio was not a communist, hie 
closeness to Sukarno and his position as head of BPI, 
the state intelligence body, made him a target for 
Kostrad intelligence. Another spin-off from the KAMI 
ban was that it split the territorial commanders. Those 
loyal to Sukarno would have to halt the student 
protests. The inevitable happened. Although KAMI was 
banned, most commanders allowed the demonstrations 
to continue. Things were leading to a showdown. 
General Nasution and those loyal to him remained at 
army HQ 24 hours a day as the students stepped up 
their actions, crippling city life and the economy. 
Sukarno regarded the demonstrations as a kind of 
declaration of -war and ordered the University of 
Indonesia in Jakarta to close. This merely fanned the 
flames and the demonstrations spread to other cities. 
The Palace encircled 
On 10 March, General Sabur, Sukarno's adjutant and 
commander of the Cakrabirawa regiment, the Palace 
guard, reported that army troops were concentrated 
outside the palace, ready to attack. Other officers 
alerted the President about this and advised him to 
leave for Bogor, which he did. 
In his autobiography, Nasution refers to an en-
counter with General Alamsyah from Suharto's staff. 
Nasution was annoyed that the army had failed to 
arrest Subandrio and other cabinet minister• who 
were defying the military. Alamsyah told Nasution that 
in the army's view, several important commanders 
were still loyal to the President while others were 
wavering. However, said Alamsyah, Suharto had drawn 
up instructions for Subandrio's arrest. Some ministers 
were being so harassed by the students and the army 
that they were advised to stay at the palace over-
night. In Bogor, Sukarno needed assurances about 
palace security before returning to Jakarta to preside 
over the cabinet meeting scheduled for 11 March. He 
got these assurances from General Amir Mahmud, the 
Jakarta military commander, and returned t.o Jakarta 
on the morning of 11 March. 
Nasution quotes Slamet Bratanata, the Minister for 
Mining, who explained what happened at the meeting: 
One item on the agenda was the Cabinet's pledge of 
loyalty to the President. But it could not P_roceed 
because of an incident. Colonel Sumirat, polJce ad-
jutant to the President, went back and forth, handing 
a slip of paper to General Amir Machmud, then com-
mander of the Jakarta military command, who (for 
reasons not clear) had been asked by President 
Sukarno to attend the meeting. Three times Sumirat 
approached Amir Machmud, giving him s piece ".' 
paper. Each time Amir Mahmud put the note under his 
agenda. 
Obviously getting impatient, Sumirat finally handed 
another piece of paper to Foreign Minister Subandrio 
who was sitting next to the President. Subandrio 
immediately showed Sumirat's note to the President 
following which there was a whispered conversation 
between the President and the four Vice-Premiers. 
After Dr. Leimena was asked to chair the meeting, 
President Sukarno flew to his palace in Bogar togeth-
er with Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh. Because of the 
confusion around the Palace, Dr. Leimena closed the 
cabinet meeting without anyone signing the prepared 
loyalty statement. [Nasution page 389] 
The afgnlne ot Supene.ar 
It was in this atmosphere of intimidation that Presi-
dent Sukarno and his two vice-premiers fled to Bogor 
by helicopter. They were soon followed by a second 
helicopter bringing three generals, General Amir 
Mahmud, the one who had declined to pass on Colonel 
Sumirat's notes to the President, General Mohammad 
Yusuf, minister for industry and General Basuki 
Rachmat, commander of the East Java Division. 
It has never been explained why these three gener-
als were the ones who went to Bogor to meet the 
President. One thing is clear: Sukarno had reason to 
regard them all as trustworthy and sympathetic. Their 
own version is that they wanted to tell the President 
not to feel alienated or discarded by the army. Amir 
Mahmud has revealed [see Antara, 10 March 1971] that 
before leaving for Bogor, they met General Suharto 
who had not attended the cabinet meeting as he was 
in bed with a sore throat. According to Amir Mahmud, 
Suharto asked them to tell the President "that we can 
save Pancasila and the '45 Constitution if we have the 
complete confidence of the President". (Antara, 10 
March 1971) 
In Bogor, according to Amir Mahmud, when the 
President asked Amir Mahmud what should now be 
done, he replied: "It's easy. Hand things over (sez-
ahkan saja) to Pak Harto and everything will be 
alright." [ibid] Then, a letter from Sukarno to Suharto 
was drafted by several people present. The draft was 
typed out by General Sabur and given to President 
Sukarno. After reading the document, the President 
looking confused, showed it to Amir Mahmud who said; 
"It's fine Pak, Bismillah", to which Sukarno replied: 
"Bismillah irrahmanirahim" and signed the letter. 
This is the document that later became known as the 
Supersemar. It later transpired that the President did 
n~t :ealise the full import of the document, but by 
s1gmng this letter, he had signed his own political 
death-warrant. On the way home, Aanir Mahmud told 
his colleagues that the document meant that Sukarno 
had signed over power to Suharto. It was with thi• 
piece of paper that the 'ailing' General Suharto 
banned the PKI the next day and Jater ordered the 
arrest of 15 cabinet ministers. 
The laportance ot Superee1Mr 
Why, if Suharto was virtually already in power did 
he need the Supersemar as his ultimate weapon?' The 
point is that, although he had already taken over, 
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Suharto wanted to avoid any clashes with air force, 
army or navy units still loyal to the President. On 
hearing that Suharto had banned the PKI, Sukarno 
tried to reverse things by issuing an announcement 
on 16 March, based on discussions with his four 
deputy prime ministers and armed forces chiefs, 
complaining about "a wrong attitude" towards the 
President. In response on the next day, ''Suharto's 
forces seized control of the radio, all newspapers and 
the telephone, cable and telex services; they cut off 
Indonesia from the outside world ... The next day, (18 
March) Suharto attacked on every front open to him. 
He went to the Palace and increased his pressure on 
Sukarno to purge his cabinet while Sarwo Edhie's 
troops surrounded the compound and blocked ap-
proaching streets with barbed wire." (Brian May, The 
Indonesian Tragedy, page 142.] This was the point at 
which Sukarno finally lost the battle with Suharto. 
The strategic importance of the PU ban 
The banning of the PKI was a strategic issue. The 
Communist Party had by now been virtually wiped 
out; practically the entire leadership had been killed 
and the majority of its surviving cadres were im-
prisoned or in hiding, posing no political threat. The 
ban destroyed the cornerstone of Sukarno's political 
concept of coalition between the three major forces, 
Nationalist, Religious and Communist, the Nasakom 
concept. This is why Sukarno so stubbornly refused 
to ban the PKI. A section of Suharto's own autobiog-
raphy is devoted to this. Suharto reports Sukarno as 
telling him, prior to the Supersemar: "Har, people 
regard me as a world leader. I have proclaimed the 
Nasakom concept to the four corners of the earth. 
Now I have to ban the PKI. Where should I hide my 
face?" Sukarno was not prepared to give in, even 
when Suharto said: "If it is only for external con-
sumption, you can use me as a bumper. I will ban the 
PK!, not you. But for domestic purposes, you should 
support me." 
When this failed, Sukarno had to be dealt with by 
less persuasive means. In the end, he was tricked 
into the Supersemar trap. 
Sukarno•a politlcal demise 
Sukarno certainly did not realise the impact of the 
document he had signed nor could he have envisaged 
how Suharto would use it. His attempt to countermand 
Suharto's action foundered when Suharto used his 
troops to impose his will on the President. Alas for 
POLITICS 
Sukarno, the Supersemar machinery had already gone 
into action. Suharto, backed by many army officers, 
students and academics, pressed ahead, bypassing 
Sukarno more and more. In this post-Supersemar 
period, Suharto gradually assumed control of political 
affairs, ignoring Sukarno who spent the remaining 
years of his life living under house arrest at the 
home of his Japanese wife Dewi, where he died in total 
isolation in June 1970. 
In the last few years, younger Indonesians have 
shown renewed interest in Sukarno. Politically, 
Suharto realises that he can benefit from a reap-
praisal of his predecessor. Sukarno's adulation can 
help his own image. Suharto wants to make sure that 
Indonesian history records the change of power from 
Sukarno to Suharto as having been done in a con-
stitutional way. In his autobiography, Suharto por-
trays himself in the those early post-1965 days as a 
man of moderation and wisdom. As he puts it : "I was 
pressed in those days of political conflict to step 
forward. There were politicians who were getting 
impatient regarding the change of leadership. They 
even urged me to take power, just like that. My reply 
was that it would be better for me to retreat. Those 
ways are not correct. To grab power through military 
means will not provide the necessary stability. I am 
not prepared to leave a political testament that, in 
Indonesia, the power struggle was resolved by 
military force .... " Unfortunately for Suharto, not 
everyone, even in the armed forces, agrees. I 
*) See Masa Kebangkitan Orde Baru (The Birth of the 
New Order), Volume VI of General A.H. Naaution's 
autobiography, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas (Respon-
ding to the Call of Duty), published in 1987. 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial 
Published by TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to 
heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical ot the 
government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or 
producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held 
responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated. 
The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in 
September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire 
on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia 
about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing 
organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles. 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the 
continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime. 
128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p. 
ISBN 0 9506751 4 8 
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The mystery of Suharto's autobiography 
The publication of President Suharto's autobiography, 
scheduled to appear February, has been postponed 
indefinitely. Reliable sources in Jakarta reveal that 
the powerful General Moerdiono, the State Secretary, 
a position similar to the Chief of Staff of the White 
House, has advised the President not to allow the 
book to appear in its present form. In January 
excerpts were reproduced in the press. After some 
astonishment from friend and foe alike, a controver-
sy broke out. His candid admission that thousands of 
'mysterious killings' in 1983-84 were the work of the 
government created a stir among army officers, 
particularly loyal officers like General Benny Murdani, 
then armed forces commander, who at the time vehe-
mently denied any government role in the killings. A 
Dutch newspaper now quotes him as saying: "I had to 
lie and lie and now he writes this" (NRC He.ndelsblad 
9 March 1989). 
Sources now say that influential generals feel 
offended by a number of Suharto's frank statements 
and have demanded 'corrections'. Hence General 
Moerdiono's advice to the President to act speedily. 
No options 
One option would be to publish the book, omitting 
the offending paragraph about the killings. [See 
TAPOL Bulletin No 91] However in January, a limited 
number of copies were distributed to editors, to help 
launch the book in February by quoting lengthy 
extracts. Not only the national press but also foreign 
publications quoted at length from these advance 
copies. Indeed it was an interesting phenomena: 
Suharto, one of the world's longest surviving rulers, 
publishing his memoires while still in power. If the 
book were now to appear without the controversial 
paragraph, the damage would be very serious indeed. 
Another point of contention appears to be his 
portrayal of Sukarno. In order to back his claim that 
he took power by constitutional means, he portrays 
Sukarno in a positive light, while showing himself to 
be respectful but firm towards 'the old man''. Others 
in the regime regard Sukarno in a very different 
light, insisting on portraying him as having sided 
with the PKI and the events of 1 October 1965. 
So it seems that Suharto's wish to determine how he 
goes down in history has backfired. • 
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The front cover of a book that has failed to appear as 
scheduled. 
Indonesia under fire at the UN in Geneva 
Indonesia faced renewed criticism at the 1989 session 
of the UN Human Rights Commission regarding East 
Timor and former political prisoners.(For East Timor, 
see report on page 19) 
Call on UN to lnveat.lcat.e political persecution 
In a statement about discrimination against former 
political prisoners, Jusfiq Hadjar cal1ed for a bold new 
initiative by the Human Rights Commission this year 
"to protect millions of people in Indonesia from a 
vicious and prolonged system of discrimination". The 
system had not been modified with the passage of 
time, he said. "On the contrary, the government has 
devised new ways of keeping up the pressure on 
these persecuted people by broadening the net to 
include members of their extended families." 
Since the introduction of a Kopkamtib instruction in 
1982, the concept of 'bersih lingkungan' or 'clean en-
vironment' has become a major factor in vetting job 
applicants, as well as purging political parties, the 
journalist profession, state and local assemblies and 
much else besides. After citing some recent examples 
of the continuing purge, Hadjar said: 
For close on quarter of a century, millions of people 
in Indonesia he.ve been the victims of persecution and 
discrimination. These people, never found guilty of 
any crime in a court of law, have no hope of rehabili-
tation and the restoration of their civil rights. Unless 
the international human rights community takes action 
on their behalf, they and their offspring will Jive out 
the rest of their days as social outcasts. We therefore 
call upon the UN Commission of Human Rights: 
1. To appoint a special rapporteur to investigat:.e the 
systematic discrimination against these victims of 
political persecution in Indonesia. 
2. To call upon the Indonesian Government to rehabili-
tate all those who are suspected of alleged involve-
ment in organisations that were banned in 1965 and to 
revoke e.11 regule.tions which in any way inf1·inge their 
civil rights. • 
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Journalists test the new regulations 
Three journ4lists have recently visited East Timor, 
taking advantage of the Indonesian government's 
decision at the end of 1988 "to treat East Timor like 
other Indonesian provinces". This has enabled jour-
nalists to travel more widely in East Timor but it has 
not made it any easier for them to discover real 
conditions and seek tl1e opinions of East Timorese 
people. 
Shadowed b7 secudt7 peraonnel 
Martin Cohn of the Toronto Star was not able to shake 
off security personnel: "When I asked to travel to 
remote villages in the province (sic), the government 
insisted on an escort of armed soldiers, plainclothes 
security officers and other officers. At some inter-
views, four notepads recorded the ensuing conversa-
tion: my own, plus those of the information officer, 
protocol officer and intelligence agent. It took a 
special plea to persuade my eight minders to stay 
behind during the visit to Venilale's orphanage. Still, 
a man identified to me as a government informer 
shadowed me and photographed anyone willing to be 
interviewed." 
The orphanage Cohn visited in Venilale, south-east 
of Dili, is run by the Catholic Church and houses 150 
children whose parents who are fighting in the bush. 
Although by day 1 soldiers bring rice and cookies, by 
night as the orphans sleep, "the officers send their 
troops back bearing automatic weapons. They encircle 
the orphanage and lie in wait. hidden in the bushes. 
The soldiers suspect armed guerrillas waging a bitter 
battle for independence may venture in from their 
jungle hideouts to look in on the children. The army 
regularly interrogates any nurses who treat the 
orphans, looking for scraps of information about their 
parents' whereabouts. Now the village's four nurses 
refuse to come near the orphanage. So the children 
go sick - suffering fevers, infections, intestinal 
diseases and malnutrition." 
Cohn reported the remarks of Father Locatelli who 
runs the orphanage: "People are still scarred by the 
war, still afraid of the soldiers - because a war is a 
war. The officers are okay but the simple soldiers can 
be rough - that's the way they are. They just follow 
orders quickly, without much concern for the impact 
on local people." 
Cohn was told about military operations the prev-
ious month near the technical school and farm run by 
Locatelli. "When the soldiers arrive in the fields, the 
farmers leave," he said. [Toronto Star, 5 February 
1989) 
Arlll7 haa not lessened its grip 
Juliet Rix of the London Guardian writes that although 
the opening "has eased travel restrictions ... this does 
not mean that the army has lessened its grip." A 
travel permit is no longer needed although she said 
that potential travellers to Dili from West Timor are 
told that they need travel permits. "Details of foreig-
ners' passports are meticulously noted on arrival and 
Indonesian identity cards which most Timorese now 
have are constantly checked." The military in East 
Timor are very reluctant to leave any foreigner alone. 
"Casual callers and potential guides often turn out to 
be members of the forces." 
She spoke of military check-points every twelve 
An Indonesian warship in Dili harbour. 
miles. "Many Timorese are afraid to speak to foreig-
ners for fear of subsequent interrogation which may 
still involve physical as well as mental abuse." [The 
Guardian, 22 February) 
Criteria for visits to Indonesia 
East Timor solidarity groups meeting in Co-pen-
hagen in February 1989 adopted the following 
decision about visits to East Timor: 
Considering that Indonesia bas no ~gal right to 
be in East TiJDOr, any visit to the country 
should be able to proceed without interference 
l'rom the Indonesian authorities; considering also 
that, even though Indonesia says that East TiMOr 
is "o-pening up", the government will not allow 
anyone to enter who opposes the principle of 
occupation; 
we therefore have immediate reservations about 
any visits which do not f'ull'il the following 
conditions: 
a. free movement throughout the whole of Bast 
Timor, 
b. unsu-pervised free access to all Tiatore~, 
c. visitors should be able to cboot!J:e theh- own 
inde-pendent interpreters and advisers, 
d. visitors should be able to sta.y in Bast TiMor 
tor as Jong as they need, 
e. no limit on the nu•ber of -persons in the 
group, 
f. recognition that Bast Timorese are under 
strong pressure not to speak out for fear of 
retaliation by the Indonesian aut.horit.ies. 
Five area still cloeed in Januar7 
A Japanese journalist who visited East Timor at the 
beginning of January was told that because of con-
tinuing armed clashes between rebel forces and the 
military, five areas had not been opened up 'for 
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security reasons' and he could only visit by helicop-
ter. Although in one place he visited, he was told by 
officials that there was no more fighting, a resident 
told him that there were several clashes in July and 
November and several people were killed. 
The journalist wanted to witness the 'opening up' of 
East Timor in Dili on 1 January. But "one couldn't feel 
a mood of welcome from the people, so it was disap-
pointment. I asked everyone I met, 'What will change 
with the opening?' But the only answer I got was 
from a few who can afford expensive air fares: 'I'm 
happy that the troublesome procedures for getting 
travel permits will not be necessary.' But for the vast 
majority of poor Timorese, things will not change for 
some time, and even though they knew the news, the 
vast majority said they 'did not know' what it had to 
do with them." [ Yomiuri Shim bun, 14 January 1989) • 
British MPs visit East Timor 
Seven British parliamentarians, four Tory and three 
Labour, visited East Timor on 7-8 March. They were 
in Indonesia on the invitation of the Indonesian 
Parliament. 
TAPOL has learnt from Labour MP, Ann Clwyd that 
the first day in East Timor was spent meeting Gover-
nor Mario Carrascalao and visiting Becora Prison 
where they met four prisoners. Although a meeting 
with Bishop Belo was included on their programme, 
the MPs were told that he was not available to see 
them. This is unusual as the Bishop normally meets 
virtually all foreign visitors. This made it impossible 
for the MPs to hear for themselves the views of the 
Bishop about treatment of detainees, following his 
forthright statement on the question last December. 
One prisoner they met was Alexi Gutteres, who acted 
as a go-between for a meeting with the Fretilin 
leadership. In a discussion attended only by three 
MPs and an interpreter from the British Embassy, 
Gutteres told them he had been badly beaten and 
tortured on two occasions, from 24-26 October 1986 
and from 9-12 November 1987. He was later tried and 
given a sentence of 12 years, later reduced to 7 
years. 
Request t.o visit Baucau turned down 
A request by the MPs to visit Baucau was turned 
down because "no helicopter was available". Ann 
Clwyd later protested about this at a meeting with 
Defence Minister General Benny Murdani. 
enjoy. 
The only event on the MPs' second day was a trip 
out of Dili to attend the installation of a district 
chief. "There was no time for sight-seeing and we did 
not meet a single ordinary East Timorese so h&d no 
chance to speak to anyone about conditions in gene-
ral," Ann Clwyd told TAPOL. 
We hope to interview Ann Clwyd about her visit for 
the next issue.• 
West Papua: The Obliteration of a People 
16 
Published by: Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
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Regulating 'openness' 
Although East Timor has now been given the same administrative status as an Indonesian 
province, the military authorities are anxious t.o ensure that this does not result in outsiders, 
particularly foreigners, wandering around unchecked. As for the Timorese, the new regulations 
do not seem to mean that travel will become any easier. 
Foreign visitors 'advised• to report 
Interior Minister, General Rudini set the tone with 
a statement 'advising' foreigners wishing to visit the 
interior of East Timor to consult the local military 
commander "for safety reasons". Insisting that there 
is no problem at all, Rudini admitted that "a number 
of armed rebels are still roaming the mountainous 
areas ... If a foreigner is held at gun-point, that will 
be a problem." [Jakarta Post, 7 February 1989] 
It then became clear that persons wishing to vi11it 
East Tlmor still need a permit from the police of the 
province of East Nusatenggara (NTT), in Den Pasar, 
causing Governor Mario Carrascalao to complain that 
the authorities are in breech of presidential decision 
making East Timor 'the same as other provinces'. In 
addition, he said, police posts existed at the border 
between East Timor and NTT, giving the impression 
that East Timor is not the same at all. "If I want to go 
to West Java or East Java, I don't have to report to 
a police post. .. " [ Suars Pembsrusn, 16 February 1989] 
New controls for Bast Thaoreae 
Until the end of 1988, under East Timor's status as a 
'special region', freedom of movement for the Timorese 
was hampered by the need to possess a travel permit 
or surst jalsn. For those wishing to travel between 
sub-districts, permits were issued by the local 
military authorities with signed authorisation from a 
number of local authorities. 
Now, all East Timorese are being issued with new 
identity cards or Ksrtu Tsnda Penduduk (KTP). 
Formerly KTPs were issued by village heads, with the 
approval of the local military officer or babinsa and 
counter-signed by senior officers. The system was 
described to TAPOL by a former village head in an 
interview in Liabon last year. Anyone not possessing 
a KTP could not get a job, open a shop, obtain a 
driving licence or enrol at a school. [See TAPOL's 
statement to the UN Decolonisation Committee in 
August 1988, published as Occasional Reports No. 9.) 
It now appears that the KTP system is being over-
hauled, with responsibility being shifted to the local 
administrative officials, the district and sub-district 
chiefs. The significance of this change for the East 
Timorese remains to be seen. 
Surat .)aJan atlll needed 
It is claimed by some officials that the new-style 
KTPs will take the place of the surst jal8I1 (SIJ), Yet, 
the East Timor chief-of-police, Colonel Rusman Hadi, 
when asked whether SIJs would be needed, "replied 
cautiously that a decision will be taken that, poesibly 
in some regions, SIJs will be needed. Elsewhere the 
KTP will be sufficient. The SIJs will be issued by the 
village head or the local chief of police. 'Using a KTP 
to travel has been in force for some time, and SIJs 
will be restricted to only a few areas,' he said, 
without mentioning any of the areas." [Suara Pem-
barusn, 23 January 1989] • 
Solidarity groups meet in Copenhagen 
East Timar solidarity groups in Europe held their 
ninth international gathering in Copenhagen on 11-12 
February, hosted by IWGIA, the International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs. The meeting was 
attended by 14 organisations from Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. Also present for the second 
time was a representative of the Japanese Free East 
Timar Coalition. 
Abllio Araujo'a report 
Attending for the East Timor National Convergence, 
Abilio Araujo of Fretilin gave an assessment of the 
situation in E~st Timor and abrotld. He reported that: 
* Indonesian operations against the Timorese have 
continued with losses on both sides. Indonesian 
strategy combines military operations with smaller 
target manoeuvres, but they have failed to achieve 
their objective of destroying the leadership. 
* Political and cultural resistance has increased over 
the past year. The Saint Anthony Movement is a mass 
religious movement opposed to both the Indonesians 
and the Catholic Church hierarchy. 
Abilio Araujo, Fretilin, addressing the solidarity ~ 
groups in Copenhagen. , 
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* Communications are enabling publications to reach 
the country from outside. 
* The National Convergence of UDT and Fretilin has 
entered a new stage with official discussions with the 
Portuguese Foreign Minister, as part of a strategy to 
find a diplomatic solution. 
* Fretilin leader, Xanana, wrote to the Portuguese 
Parliament recently stating his willingness to meet 
any Portuguese MPs travelling to East Timor to 
discuss Fretilin's Peace Plan. 
Abilio Araujo also brought embroidered emblems and 
badges made by the women of the East Timor resis-
tance, as gifts to the participating organisations. 
The conference analysed the situation in East Timor 
while developing concrete action plans for the coming 
months. The main conclusion was, in spite of asser-
tions to the contrary, that there has been no im-
provement in human rights in East Timor. The meeting 
was told that an estimated 2000 Timorese people were 
killed during 1988 while 3000 were arrested arbitrar-
ily in Dili prior to the visit of General Suharto to Dill. 
It noted the reaction of Bishop Ximenes Belo of East 
Timor on 5 December: "We oppose this barbaric system 
and condemn the lying propaganda, according to 
which human rights violations do not exist in East 
Timor". 
After analysing changes in Indonesian policy 
towards East Timor, the meeting formulated minimal 
conditions regarding visits to East Timor 
Actions ln 1989 
It discussed coordination to strengthen Parliamen-
tarians for East Timor (PET), lobby governments 
UDT leader ln Lisbon dies 
The leader of the UDT in Lisbon, Dr. Moises do 
Amaral, died suddenly of a heart attack on 15 Februa-
ry.. Dr do Amaral was a fervent Timorese nationalist 
who supported resistance to Indonesian rule in East 
Timor and took a leading part in setting up the East 
Timor National Convergence in March 1986. 
His funeral on 16 February was attended by many 
hundreds of people from all sections of the East 
Timorese community and turned into an occasion for 
the expression of strong solidarity between the UDT 
and Fretilin. Many Portuguese politicians and activists 
were also present to pay their last tribute to a well-
respected East Timorese leader.• 
before this year's IGGI meeting in June, to petition 
the UN Decolonisation Committee in New York in 
August, and raise the issue of East Timor at a Peace 
Conference to be held in The Hague in June 1989 on 
the initiative of Nicaragua. The meeting welcomed the 
European Parliament resolution on East Timar (Doc. 
82-143/88) adopted September 1988, the strongest 
resolution on East Timor in recent years which was a 
resounding defeat for Indonesia's 1988 diplomatic 
offensive. It also discussed the possibflity of arrang-
ing a hearing on East Timor in Strasbourg after the 
European Parliament elections in June 1989 and 
requesting the European Commission to file a progress 
report on the situation in East Timor. 
The meeting also welcomed the principled diplomatic 
initiative being taken in Portugal to implement Article 
297 of the Constitution to "promote and guarantee the 
right to the independence of East Timor". The con-
ference favoured realisation of a plan for an interna-
tional conference of MPs on East Timor and hoped this 
would take place in Lisbon in 1989. 
The European delegates were impressed by the 
rapid rise and consolidation of the Free East Timar 
Coalition in Japan and will support internationally its 
work of trying to lobby and influence public opinion 
and Japanese Government policy on East Timar. 
The conference also decided to send a letter to 
Amnesty International criticising its recent statements 
on human rights in East Timor. A copy of this state-
ment can be obtained from IWGIA, Fiolstraede 10, Dk-
1171, Copenhagen K, Denmark. 
The next conference will take place in January 1990, 
either in Spain or the UK.• 
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Birth control scare in Dili 
There is renewed fear in East Timor that women are 
being subjected to forced sterilisation. The first hint 
came with a statement by Haryono Suyono, head of 
the Family Planning Agency (BKKBN), denying that 
compulsion was being used by his Agency in East 
Timor. [STT, 1-7 Dec 1988) 
The denial was apparently in response to suspicions 
aroused when all the girls but none of the boys at 
high schools in Dili were given injections, and were 
told they were anti-tetanus injections. The matter was 
given a brief public airing when the Dili-based 
newspaper, Suara Timor Timur reported that three 
schoolgirls visited the paper's office in December and 
said they had been given allegedly anti-tetanus 
injections which led to a 'misunderstanding' that they 
were being sterilised. {STT, 26 Jan - 1 Feb, 1989] 
The matter was taken no further by the paper but 
Governor Mario Carrascalao spoke about the issue 
during an interview with Matra, a monthly journal for 
business executives. Asked why he recently spoke 
angrily to doctors and medical personnel, he said: 
Th~y recently carried out an injection programme in 
the State SMA I and II and SMEA schools [upper 
seconda1·y schools]. Only the women were injected and 
they were told they were anti-tetanus injections. 
Okay. So I asked: 'Why only the women?' I was told: 
'To ensure that if they get married later on and 
become pregnant, their children will not fall ill.' 
So I told them that birth control in East Timor is a 
very sensitive issue, Up to now we have kept a low 
profile, not using all kinds of things. But now the 
issue has blown up, about the BKKBN asking the 
health authorities to carry out a programme of 
injections said to be for anti-tetanus but in fact for 
sterilisation. The birth control programme is a nation-
al programme, but a nations} programme for regions 
where conditions are normal .... 
· Then the story spread overseas, that Indone•is. is 
carrying out sterilisation in East Timor in order to 
exterminate the East Timorese. So I said: 'You gentle-
men have provided material which can be used by 
people abroad to condemn the Indonesian government. 
[Matrs, January 1989] 
Although Carrascalao was hoping to undo the 
damage done by this injection programme, the effect 
is just the opposite. Few people are likely to believe 
the explanation about anti-tetanus injections. This is 
possibly the clearest evidence that forced sterilisation 
is indeed being carried out in East Timor. • 
UN 'Population Award' for Suharto 
Indonesia's President, General Suharto, whose 
regime came to power in the wake of msssacres 
which left an estimated one million people dead 
and whose invasion of Ee.st Timor brought death 
and destruction to a third of the populstion, i• 
to receive the UN's 1989 Population Award. 
Suharto will travel to New York to receive the 
A ward on 8 June. 
Former Dili official speaks out 
As in previous yes.rs, an East Timorese refugee this 
year addressed the UN Human Rights Commission in 
Geneva, just four months after leaving Dili. 
Testifying about the human rights situation in East 
Timor was Joao Maria do Reis who, until he left Dili in 
October 1988, was employed by the Department of 
Information in the provincial administration. The 
Department is headed by a Timorese but 95" of the 
officials are Indonesian. They control foreign visits, 
choose places to be visited as well as the people who 
ma.y speak to foreign visitors. 
Although he was privileged as a civil servant, he 
said: "I chose to leave my country because I did not 
feel at ease under foreign occupation and also in 
order to escape from persecution from which no 
Timorese is ever safe." 
He was arrested three times, in December 1975 in 
October 1976 and in December 1980 when he was 
falsely accused of taking part in an attack on Dili's 
TV centre. On each occasion he was tortured. 
He testified about the following case which occurred 
in 1988: 
Three students from Cribas, one of whom was my 
r 
The heads of two Timorese killed by Indonesian troops 
in October 1988. 
cousin, Domingos Alves, were forced by Red Berets to ~ 
go into the bush... to contact the resistance, They 
carried with them a document... in case they were 
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Raising the flag in Jayapura 
By Evelien van den Broek, West Papua Volksfront 
On 14 December last year, 66 Papuans, including men, 
women, teenagers and old people, marched to the 
Mandala Sports Stadium in Jayapura and pulled down 
the Indonesian flag. In its place, they raised the West 
Papuan flag, the Sampari or Morning Star, together 
with the flag of Papua New Guinea. Indonesian troops 
rushed in, arrested most of the demonstrators and 
drove them away in vans. This is the first time that 
such a large group of people has been engaged in 
such a demonstrative act of defiance. 
During their detention, the women were stripped 
naked and harassed by soldiers. At the end of Decem-
ber, 33 of the detainees were released. In January, 
the West Papua Volksfront (People's Front) in Holland 
received reports that ten of the detainees were killed. 
According to the Papua New Guinea press, six people 
were due to be tried in Jayapura at the beginning of 
February, while another seven were also reported to 
be awaiting trial. [Times of Papua New Guinea, 26/I -
1/11, 1989) No reports about these trials have ap-
peared in the Indonesian press and the flag-raising 
event was not reported either. 
In solidarity, more that sixty Papuans and Dutcn 
sympathisers marched on 9 February from the Inter-
national Court of Justice in The Hague to the In-
donesian Embassy where they hoisted the Sampari. 
For almost three hours, the street in front of the 
Embassy was occupied by people waving Sampari and 
Vanuatu flags, singing West Papuan songs and shout-
ing anti-Indonesian and pro-OPM slogans. 
FJac-ralaln.g, a a71abol of realatance 
Since the beginning of the Indonesian occupation, 
raising the Sampari flag has been used as a demons-
tration of West Papuan nationalism and resistance. 
West Papuans are well aware of the risks involved, 
but in a country where it is forbidden to have your 
continuation from page 19 
intercepted by any Indonesian battalion. The first dsJ 
they were found by the 125 battalion which, ignoring 
the document, separated Domingos from the other two 
and proceeded to torture him, using a knife. When 
they heard his screams, the other two tried to escape. 
One was shot but the other managed to reach the 
village and informed Domingos' relatives. Domingos' 
father protested to the Red Berets but only after 
three days did he manage to get authorisation to go 
to the place where it had happened. He found the 
body of his son. His head had been severed from the 
body and sexual organs cut off and stuffed in the 
mouth. Back st the village he received orders not to 
divulge what had happened. It was an Indonesian that 
reported all this to me, and later I got confirmation 
from relatives. • 
West Papua's Morning Star unfurled outside the 
Indonesian Embassy in The Hague on 9 February. 
own political party and where freedom of expression 
is non-existent, people seeks ways of letting the 
world know about their plight. These are some of the 
best-known cases: 
* On 4 August 1980, six women from the village of 
Orma raised the Sampari flag in the forecourt of the 
provincial governor's office. They were all arrested 
on the spot and suffered maltreatment and rape 
during their detention. One of the women gave birth 
to a son while in detention. Several years after their 
arrest, they were tried and given prison sentences. 
They served their sentences in Wamena in the Baliem 
Valley, making contact with their families difficult. 
* In July 1980, a flag-raising protest took place in 
Price: 50 pence a copy. 
80 pence for two coplf'S 
ond 30 pf"nce for eoch 
extra copy, Including 
postage. 
Occasional Reports No 9, TAPOl.'s submission ID the 
1988 meeUnq of the UN DecolonlsaUon Committee, 
focusses c:n the mllltarlsed stnx:bire of the Indaleslan 
adm lnlstration ln East Tlmor and the tl9ht system of 
control whlch this Imposes oo the peq>le. 
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Sentani, west of Jayapura, where the airport is 
located and where there is a heavy concentration of 
troops. The troops were asleep at the time. When they 
woke up and discovered what had happened, they 
rushed to Abepura and opened fire on defenceless 
civilians. Five people were shot dead, three were 
wounded and fifteen were arrested. 
* On 3 July 1982, nine students of Cendrawasih 
University pulled down the Indonesian flag in front 
of the provincial assembly building in Jayapura. They 
raised the Sampari flag and read out a proclamation 
of the state of West Papua. They were all arrested 
immediately and later tried. Four of the students 
received ten-year sentences, three received seven-
year sentences and the others were given four-year 
sentences. The four with longer sentences were moved 
to Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya, East Java to serve 
out their sentences far from home and their families. 
* In February 1984, a man raised the Sampari flag in 
Jayapura. He was shot dead on the spot. 
WEST PAPUA 
• 
The men and women who hoist the Sampari flag are 
peace-loving people who want an end to Indonesian 
oppression and the violation of human rights. They 
try in this way to give expression to their nationalist 
sentiments and the right of the West Papuan people to 
self-determination. 
Flag-raising may seem to be an innocent outlet for 
Papuan aspirations, but in face of the harsh reactions 
of the Indonesian authorities, they have become 
courageous acts of resistance to foreign domination. 
Thousands of tribal people threatened 
by Scott Paper 
If Scott goes ahead with its investment in West Papua, 
15,000 tribal people will lose traditional rights over 
land in the forests of the Digul River watershed 
which has supported their hunter-gatherer way of 
life for thousands of years. The Auyu, Ma.rind, Man-
dobo and Ya.bray tribes all own sago stands in Scott's 
790,000 hectare concession area, in Merauke province, 
West Papua. They also harvest other forest products 
including the leaves and bark of the kayu putih tree 
which are sold to make medicinal oils. 
The paper giant claims that 6,000 jobs will be 
created by the eucalyptus wood chipping and pulp 
processing venture but these are likely to go to 
transmigrants from Java, not to local tribe.speople. 
Besides, the Indonesian government will feel more 
obliged to help its Javanese subjects already in West 
Papua, who are enduring hardships on transmigration 
sites. Astra, the Indonesian partner in Scott-Astra 
Cellulosa, expressed the hope that transmigrants 
would be employed [Tempo, 4 February 1989) although 
another source said as many indigenous people as 
possible would be absorbed. With Indonesia's attitude 
towards tribal unmistakeably one of superiority, it is 
not hard to guess who Astra will prefer to employ. 
Tempo explains that the enterprise has already 
become 'a national project' in Indonesia's strategy to 
generate revenue from the non-oil and gas sector. 
Such is the importance attached to the venture that 
the concession area has been sealed off by the 
military and the government has announced that 
opposition to the project will be regarded as 'anti-
nationalist' behaviour. 
Indonesian NOO. speak out 
Nevertheless, Indonesian NGOs have voice opposition. 
A press statement issued by ten NGOs in December 
demanded more access to information on the project 
and consideration of alternatives which would be less 
destructive to the environment of the people of Digul. 
As a result, on January 5, NGOs were invited to a 
meeting by Emil Salim, the Popu.lation and Environ-
West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea, with a 
visitor from Port Moresby, shortl;y after their arrival 
in PNG in 1984. 
ment Minister attended by forestry, industry and 
population and environment officials, members of the 
Irian Jaya planning board and Scott Paper represen-
tatives. Scott presented plans tor an environmental 
impact assessment and, at the insistence of the NGOs, 
undertook to carry out a social impact assessment 
based on terms of reference decided by the NGOs. 
It is unlikely that after spending millions of dollars 
on the impact analysis and test plots, Scott will pack 
up and go home. On the contrary, it is widely feared 
that the company will start clearing large areas in 
preparation for eucalyptus plantations before the 
assessments have been concluded. 
Barry Kotek. managing director of Scott. and Ivan 
Trubacek, Manager of World Wide Fibre Strategy, 
made a tour of the concession site in December, ~ 
meeting with the regional government. They then 
returned to Jakarta and met Salim. Paul Wolfowltz, US 
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ambassador was reportedly also at the meeting - an 
indication of the importance attached to the deal by 
Washington. 
Int.ernaUonal concern 
The Scott project has attracted attention from 
campaigners worldwide including Friends of the 
Earth Pollution Probe and Survival International. 
' . d After writing several letters, TAPOL finally receive 
a reply from Scott - a standard letter assuring us 
that "in completing the environmental and sociological 
assessments, we will be working with local special 
interest groups and the government, as well as the 
officials and peoples of Irian Jaya". But the damage 
has already been done. Scott's concession was con-
firmed and the pulp mill permit approved before 
anybody thought of talking to 'the peoples of Irian 
Jaya'. 
Aatra t.o continue reaardleaa 
Even if Scott withdrawa, Astra says the project will 
go ahead. Scott's rival, Kleenex, is looking for. an 
investment in West Papua. With another Pftper giant 
waiting in the wings, Astra's task of wooing a new 
partner should not prove difficult.• 
Transmigration and security 
One of the sinister - and rarely mentioned - motives of the transmigration programme has again 
been confirmed by Defence Minister, General. Murdani. Speaking at a Young Transmigrant Pioneer 
meeting, he said transmigration was not only concerned with population redistribution but was 
"related to the importance of territorial. development which al.so means spreading out human 
resources as a defence and security potential". [Pelita, 14 January 1989] 
_ ransmigration is explained in various ways, accord-
ing to who is doing the explaining, and why. To 
international lending agencies it is presented as a 
pt·ogrnmme for poverty relief and outer island deve-
lopment; those concerned for the welfare of local 
peoples in transmigration areas are told that the 
programme is designed to benefit locals as well as the 
Javanese transmigrants. Transmigration appeals to 
Indonesian nationalists who regard it as instrumental 
in the achievement of national unity. It should hardly 
be surprising therefore, that the Minister of Defence 
stresses its role in national security and defence. 
But such statements are surprising and rare be-
cause the government has tended to play down this 
uncompromisingly political aspect of transmigration. 
Funding the deployment of a permanent Javanese 
cordon sanitaire along borders and in other 'trouble 
spots' would hardly be the most palatable way to 
describe what the World Bank and other international 
supporters are funding, even though this security 
motive is well known. 
Tranamlaratlon t.o keep lta moJMntua 
The present Transmigration Minister, Lieutenant-
General Sugiarto, more cautious than his predecessor, 
has made some startling announcements recently. 
Despite the bad publicity and mounting criticism since 
the Ecologist critique of 1986, despite the World 
Bank's reservations about supporting the programme, 
Sugiarto has announced that the target for trans-
migration in the coming five year economic plan (1989-
1994) will be 550,000 families. 370,000 of these will be 
transmigran swakarsa (self-financing) and only 
180,000 families will be fully supported by the gov-
ernment. Evidently the idea is to keep numbers up 
and costs down. To accommodate these new arrivals, 
the government is to construct 275 new residential 
areas comprising 1,100 new transmigration sites, in 
Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantnn and West Papua. 
Construction on such a vast scale can only lead to the 
impoverishment of local communities and will inflict 
yet more damage on the already over-burdened 
environment. 
Sugiarto's announcement represents a confirmation 
of the government's commitment to transmigration: 
around two million people will be resettled in new 
Transmigrants in Semarang,' Central Java, setting out 
for their new homes. 
sites when many transmigrants in existing sites are 
still in dire need of help. Disease, malnutrition, 
infertile soil, lack of roads and markets, inadequate 
housing and health care; these are some of the 
problems being faced by many transmigrants. 
$189 allllon aore international aid 
International support plays a major role. $650 
million has so far been provided by the World Bank 
and a new loan of $150 million was negotiated in 
November 1988. The fact that the latest loan ie to be 
channelled towards improving the existing site• and 
building road links indicates that the Bank has been 
feeling the pressure from the critics. But the general 
direction of the transmigration policy is not affected. 
In addition, the UN World Food Programme has 
recently announced a new injection of $39 million food 
aid for transmigrants in Sumatra. 
These new funds will free government funds from 
these support responsibilities so that they can be 
directed towards the funding of new sites to ensure 
that transmigration keeps up its momentum. • 
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IGGI aid and the budget 
When President Suharto visited Tokyo in February to 
attend the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, the war 
criminal whose imperial army occupied Indonesia and 
exploited its people for three-and-a-half years, he 
made sure of utilising the 'solemn' occasion to per-
suade the Japanese Government to grant Indonesia 
even more economic assistance than last year. With 
still four months to go before the 1989 meeting of the 
Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 
Suharto discussed this year's aid with both Prime 
Minister Noboru Takeshita and Barber Conable, 
President of the World Bank. 
58.2X rise in revenue from external aid 
Indonesia's reliance on foreign aid is now greater 
than ever. The 1989/1990 budget announced by Su-
harto in January provided for a 58.2" increase in 
revenue from foreign aid, which rose from 7 ,160 
trillion rupiahs in 1988/1989 to 11,325 trillion rupiahs. 
Dependence on foreign aid for government investment, 
normally referred to as 'economic development', has 
increased from a massive 80" in the current financial 
year to 86% in 1989/1990. Indeed, it was thanks only 
to the huge increase in foreign aid announced at last 
A rattan factory near Surabaya, East Java. The export 
of rattan furniture is part of the drive to compensate 
for falling foreign exchange earnings from oil. 
year's IGGI meeting that Suharto was able this year 
to announce an expansionary budget, attempting to 
reverse the stagnation that has marked Indonesia's 
economy in previous years. IGGI aid rose last year to 
$5. 7 billion, which was nearly 80% higher than the 
$3.15 billion provided in 1987. The chief source of this 
increase was Japan whose aid last year, at $2.3 
billion, was 87% higher than in the previous year. 
[See TAPOL Bulletin No 88, August 1988) 
During his meeting with Takeshita, Suharto asked 
Japan to increase its 'special aid' from $1. 7 billion last 
year to $1.9 billion this time round. Unlike project aid 
which is tied to specific projects, 'special aid' is 
convertible into rupiahs on the currency market. It is 
indeed likely that Indonesia will depend more than 
ever on Japanese economic assistance as other IGGI 
countries, and possibly also the multilateral agencies 
like the World Bank, may find it difficult to go on 
paying out more and more to Jakarta each year. Last 
year, World Bank loans to Indonesia amounted to more 
than $1 billion, an all-time record. 
So far, all that is known about 1989 is that the 
World Bank has agreed to provide credit worth $350 
million to boost private enterprise in Indonesia. The 
last credit negotiated by the Bank in 1988 was $150 
million for the transmigration programme. The Asian 
Development Bank has agreed to increase its credit to 
Indonesia from $560 million to $600 million in 1989. 
'Bloodlettlna• debt aervicing 
The gravity of Indonesia's dependence on external 
credit was spelt out by former cabinet minister, Moh. 
Sadli who wrote about the "bloodletting amount of 
debt service payments" which is now by far the 
largest single item in state expenditure. "The inflow 
of new aid will probably about equal repayments of 
principal, and if interest is included, then there will 
be a net outflow." [Jakarta Post, 23 December 1988] 
Indonesia's debt service ratio, the percentage of 
foreign currency earnings absorbed to service its 
foreign, now stands at over 36% • 
IGGI aeaber countrlea 
Readers wishing to raise the question of In-
donesia's human rights record with IGGI member 
governments should note that the following 
countries attend the annual meetings as members 
or observers: 
Australia 
Belgium 
Canada 
West Germany 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Denmark 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Sweden 
USA 
This year's meeting will take place in June in 
Amsterdam. 
TAPOL writes to Japanese Prime Minister 
On 20 February, TAPOL wrote to Noboru Takeshita, 
the Japanese Prime Minister asking him to use the 
occasion of his forthcoming meeting with President 
Sukarno to raise the question of East Timor. It said 
that Indonesia was now the largest recipient of 
Japanese overseas aid, and went on: "We firmly 
believe that the massive aid which your Government 
grants to Indonesia should be made conditional on the 
cessation of human rights abuses in East . Timor and 
the conduct of a genuine act of self-determination for 
the people of East Timor." 
It also drew attention to Japan's increasing impor-
tance in the World Bank and the IMF. "We hope that 
the Japanese member on the (Bank's) Board of Direc-
tors will pay close attention to the Bank's own criter-
ia regarding land rights for rural people... and 
ensure that the Bank pays due regard for social and 
environmental issues in Indonesia." a 
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Student protest, 
a new generation 
Students from a number of universities held an 'Antl-
Violence' demonstration in Jogjakarta on 25 February. 
There were many posters proclaiming anger at the 
penetration of violence in all aspects of life. The 
students shouted slogans and listened to protest 
poetry read by the poet, Emha Ainun Najib. 
"In the past few years, violence has become part of 
our environment. Violence has entered the core of our 
being. Violence is perpetrated against our body and 
soul. Anger and arbitrariness are the only response 
to differences of opinion and dissent," said one 
speaker. 
There was a protest march from Lapangan Pancasila 
to the Gajah Mada University (UGM) campus at Bulak-
sumur. Security forces were conspicuous everywhere 
but the event passed off peacefully. [Susrs Merdeks, 
26 February and 1 March) 
The UGM Rector, Professor Kusnadi Hardjasumantri 
later summoned students involved in the protest to 
warn them that any future action of this nature would 
result in firm measures against those responsible. He 
alleged that by taking their action outside the cam-
pus, the students "might invite disruption" as it can 
involve the "uncontrolled masses". He also chastised 
the students for not seeking permission or even 
informing the university authorities. One of the 
organisers said in response that they had deliberately 
not sought permission for what was intended to be a 
spontaneous action. "We felt it best not to inform the 
Rector. In any case, the student senates (officially-
recognised campus bodies) would not have supported 
our action." [Kompas, 28 February] 
Calla tor caapua fnedoa 
The Jogjakarta action came after many calls in late 
1988 for political freedoms to be restored in the 
campuses. Ten years ago, after student demonstra-
tions in 1978, the government clamped down on 
student organisations by introducing a policy called 
'Normalisation of Campus Life' (Normalisasi Kehidupan 
Kampus). 
The Education Minister, Fuad Hassan, judged in 
some circles to be a liberal, has had difficulty defen-
ding government policy against growing discontent 
among the students. On a visit to Jogjakarta to open 
an art exhibition last November, posters were sudden-
ly unfurled at the meeting and a student representing 
the Jogjakarta Students Communication Forum rose to 
read out a statement calling for the restoration of 
campus autonomy. Although attempts were made by 
his staff to extricate the Minister by claiming he had 
to hurry back to Jakarta, he agreed to stay for a 
quarter of an hour to discuss the students' grievan-
ces. [Kompas, 21 November 1988] 
Later the Department's chief of higher education, 
Soekadji Ranoewihardjo, stepped in to Justify NKK. In 
any case, it would not be easy to change the policy as 
"many relevant agencies" besides the Education 
Ministry were involved. [Jakarta Post, 16 December] 
Sukadji later announced that the government has 
now agreed on a definitive interpretation of 'academic 
TAPOL now on Fu 
TAPOL office now has a fax on (01) 771-2904, available 
for use any time between 8 am and 11 pm our time. 
freedom', warning in a letter to university chiefs that 
"misinterpretations must stop before things worsen". 
By government edict, academic freedom has nothing to 
do with students. It belongs only to academicians 
"who can exercise the right to conduct academic 
activities such as research and debates for purely 
academic purposes". [Jakarta Post, 16 December] 
To put a stop to the growing demands for an end to 
NKK, Major-General Asmono (whose full title is 'Assis-
tant for Social-Political Affairs of the Chief-of-Staff 
for Social-Political Affairs' or Assospol Kssospol for 
short) declared that a "tiny minority of students are 
creating a fuss about it" and were trying to "build 
their own potential and a priori to oppose the gov-
ernment". Student demonstrations and opposition to 
the government were "not only not relevant, they 
could also disrupt national stability in all fields", he 
said. [Kedaulatan Rskyat, 26 January 1989] 
'Soapol' permits needed 
Students wishing to undertake studies in society in 
order to write essays for degree courses must first 
apply to the social-political chief of the provincial 
government for permission. "The procedure for 
getting these permits is extremely complicated," said 
one student, during a lecture at a management course 
given by the Minister of Education. The Minister 
expressed "utter amazement" that this was necessary, 
even though he was told that special permits were 
required in virtually every part of the country. He 
asked to be given details . from every university and 
institute. When he told the students that academic 
freedom meant that "everyone has the right to 
develop their scientific thought", students responded 
by saying that such 'freedoms' were obstructed by 
the difficulty of obtaining permits for investigative 
work. [Kompas, 30 January)• 
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